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THE PUNISHMENT AND PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE:
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AS A BENCHMARK OF 
PROGRESS AND NEED
Christine H. Chung
INTRODUCTION
Sixty years ago, the drafters of the Genocide Convention envisioned 
the creation of an “international judicial organ” that would be available to 
try individuals accused of committing genocide and other crimes under in-
ternational law.1 Article VI of the Convention itself specified the possibility 
that persons charged with genocide be tried by such “international penal 
tribunal as may have jurisdiction” by agreement of contracting States.2 To-
day, following decades of a difficult “birthing” process, the permanent in-
ternational criminal tribunal anticipated by the drafters of that Convention—
the International Criminal Court (ICC)—has been in operation for nearly 
five years.3 The ICC has issued eleven arrest warrants relating to war crimes 
and crimes against humanity committed during three of the gravest ongoing 
conflicts in the world: in the Darfur region of the Sudan, in northern Ugan-
da, and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Its first trial, of an 
alleged DRC warlord, is scheduled to begin in June 2008.  
A handful of years are a slim record upon which to begin reaching 
any conclusions. Still, in the spirit of commemorating the negotiation and 
adoption of the Genocide Convention, this article offers observations on the 
manner in which the earliest operations of the “international judicial organ” 
foreseen by the Convention drafters demonstrate and underscore: (1) 
 Senior Fellow at the Schell Center for International Human Rights, Yale Law School. 
The author was a senior trial attorney in the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC from 2004–
2007, and former federal prosecutor in the United States from 1991–2003. The author ex-
presses gratitude to Rebecca Hamilton and Nicholas Leddy, students at Harvard Law School 
and American University, Washington College of Law, respectively, for their contributions 
to this article. 
1 See G.A. Res. 260 (III) at 177 (Dec. 9, 1948) (adopting the Genocide Convention and 
stating the General Assembly’s consideration “that, in the course of development of the 
international community, there will be an increasing need of an international judicial organ 
for the trial of certain crimes under international law.”). 
2 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 6, Dec. 9, 
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
3 The years are counted from the swearing in of the Prosecutor of the ICC in June 2003. 
The first ICC investigations were commenced in the summer of 2004. 
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progress in the mission of punishing and preventing genocide and other 
crimes of international concern, and (2) the difficulties and next challenges 
in accomplishing the Genocide Convention’s objectives. 
PROGRESS
On the progress front, the ICC has begun fulfilling at least three 
core aims of the Genocide Convention drafters. 
A.  Strengthening of the International Rule of Law 
Most fundamentally, the ICC represents and fosters international 
consensus supporting a rule of law that defines genocide and other mass 
atrocities as crimes condemned by the civilized world. The Genocide Con-
vention expressed an agreement among States that genocide is a crime un-
der international law and obligated ratifying States to adopt domestic legis-
lation criminalizing genocide, as defined in the Convention.4 Nearly fifty 
years after the adoption of the Convention, in signing the treaty at Rome 
that created the ICC, States again reached consensus that genocide is a 
crime, under the same definition set forth in the Convention.5 The signatory 
States also placed war crimes and crimes against humanity within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, judging that these crimes, like genocide, were among “the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.”6 The 
growing number of countries that continue to ratify the Rome Statute—at 
latest count, 106 countries7—represents the continuing commitment to a 
rule of law that criminalizes genocide, as well as an expanded consensus 
that war crimes and crimes against humanity are also crimes of international 
concern. As with the Genocide Convention, ICC ratification serves as a 
catalyst for harmonizing domestic standards to an international rule of law, 
because States that ratify the Rome Statute often also adopt ICC definitions 
of crimes in their domestic legislation. 
The building of the consensus expressed by the Genocide Conven-
tion grows in at least three dimensions via the ICC ratification process. 
First, there is the fact that through joining the ICC, additional countries have 
4 Genocide Convention, supra note 2, at arts. 1, 4.  
5 Compare Genocide Convention, supra note 2, at art.2, with Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, art. 6, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 37 I.L.M. 1002 (entered into 
force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute] (using same definition for genocide as the 
Genocide Convention). Crimes against humanity and war crimes are placed within the juris-
diction of the ICC in the Rome Statute at articles 7 and 8, respectively. Id.
6 See Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 5. 
7 See Press Release, United Nations, Madagascar Ratifies Statute Establishing Interna-
tional Criminal Court (Mar. 17, 2008), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID= 
26002&Cr=genocide&Cr1=.  
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accepted the norm that genocide and other mass atrocities are indeed crimes 
deserving of international judgment and denunciation. Japan, which recently 
joined the ICC, is one of eighteen countries that never ratified the Genocide 
Convention, but have elected to ratify the Rome Statute. 8
Second, through ratification of the Rome Statute, States bind them-
selves to enforce the international rule of law within their own borders and 
agree that, if they fail, the ICC may intervene.9 This simple commitment 
represents a huge innovation. Like Odysseus, who bound himself to the 
mast in anticipation of hearing the Sirens, States that join the ICC have fo-
reseen the possibility of their own frailty and have committed themselves to 
the fail-safe remedy. Member States pledge to support the permanent inter-
national criminal court in its work by means of an international cooperation 
network. The States also express, through the 128 articles of the Rome Sta-
tute, consensus upon the specific procedures, standards, and cooperation 
mechanisms by which perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes should be brought to justice under universal standards of 
fairness. The Rome Statute, in short, creates both a court and an internation-
al criminal justice system.  
Finally, the ICC’s existence simultaneously strengthens the instru-
ment that will always constitute the primary “line of defense” against geno-
cide and other crimes under international law—domestic punishment of 
those crimes. The Genocide Convention recognized that the operations of 
any international judicial organ must be complementary to the enforcement 
efforts of States.10 The ICC, likewise, complements national enforcement 
mechanisms in that it possesses authority to act only when States are “un-
willing” or “unable” to do so.11 By its existence and operations, however, 
the ICC raises the bar of domestic accountability, even while pursuing in-
ternational prosecutions. For example, knowledge that the ICC was ready to 
exercise its jurisdiction created the incentive for the then-transitional gov-
8 For status of ratifications of the Genocide Convention, see Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Genocide New York, 9 December 1948, http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/ 
1.htm. The status of ratifications of the Rome Statute is reported in, “Multilateral Treaties 
Deposited with the Secretary-General,” at ch. 18, pt. 10, Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXV 
III/treaty11.asp; see also The State Parties to the Rome Statute, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/statesparties.html (listing the 106 State parties to the Rome Statue); see also Coalition 
for the International Criminal Court, Ratification of the Rome Statute,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=romeratification.
9 See Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 17 (providing that a case can only be deemed 
admissible, and thus susceptible of prosecution by the ICC, if a State which otherwise would 
have jurisdiction is “unwilling or unable” to prosecute it).  
10 Genocide Convention, supra note 2, at arts. 5, 6. 
11 See supra note 8.  
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ernment of the DRC to invite an investigation into crimes committed in that 
country which otherwise would have escaped scrutiny. The DRC govern-
ment self-referred the investigation of crimes allegedly committed in the 
DRC to the ICC after ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo made public 
statements that he was prepared to use proprio motu powers to initiate an 
investigation.12
The spread of the domestic enactment of ICC standards also streng-
thens State enforcement. In the United Kingdom, the International Criminal 
Court Act of 2001, which was enacted in connection with the ratification of 
the Rome Statute, became the basis for military charges brought in 2005 
against soldiers in the British Army for allegedly committing war crimes 
against civilian prisoners in Iraq.13 In the Netherlands, Dutch prosecutors 
publicly identified statements in which the Prosecutor of the ICC had en-
couraged the investigation of the “criminal business” of war, as motivation 
for two domestic prosecutions relating to war crimes and human rights 
abuses in the Middle East and Africa: one in which a Dutch businessman 
was charged with furnishing chemicals to Saddam Hussein,14 and another in 
12 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Lecture at Case Western Reserve University School of Law, The 
International Criminal Court: Seeking Global Justice (Oct. 16, 2007) (describing events 
leading to the ICC investigation in the DRC) available at http://law.case.edu/centers/cox/ 
webcast.asp?dt=20071016&type=wmv; see also Luis Moreno-Ocampo, The International 
Criminal Court: Seeking Global Justice, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 215 (2008). Under the 
Rome Statute, the Prosecutor may initiate an investigation but if he or she does so, the judges 
of a Pre-Trial Chamber must also authorize the investigation. See Rome Statute, supra note 5, 
at art. 15. Investigations may also be commenced by means of referral by a State Party, or 
referral by the U.N Security Council. See id. at arts. 13, 14. 
13 See, e.g., U.K. Soldiers Face War Crimes Trial, BBC NEWS, July 20, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/uk/4698251.stm (noting that three U.K. citizens are 
being prosecuted for alleged “inhumane treatment of persons” under the International Crimi-
nal Court Act of 2001); U.K. Soldier Jailed over Iraq Abuse, BBC NEWS, Apr. 30, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6609237.stm (describing the first conviction, after a guilty 
plea, of a U.K. citizen under the International Criminal Court Act of 2001).  
14 See Marise Simons, Holding Arms Dealers Accountable at Home, INT’L HERALD 
TRIBUNE, May 3, 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/05/02/news/ ha-
gue.php?page (noting that prosecutions of Frans van Anraat and Guus van Kouwenhoven, 
while a Dutch initiative, were prompted in part by the presence in The Hague of the ICC and 
the Prosecutor’s expressions of hope that national jurisdictions would join the ICC in inves-
tigating the “criminal business” of war). Dutch businessman Frans van Anraat was sentenced 
to seventeen years in prison for selling chemicals to Saddam Hussein used in poison gas 
weapons that killed Kurdish villagers. See Openbaar Ministerie/Frans van Anraat, Gerech-
tshof 's-Gravenhage , [Hof] [Court of Appeal, The Hague], Den Haag, 9 mai 2007, BA 4676 
(Neth.) (English translation of judgment available at http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/result
page.aspx?snelzoeken=true&searchtype=ljn&ljn=BA6734&u_ljn=BA6734); see also 
TRIAL Watch: Frans van Anraat, http://www.trial-ch.org/en/trial-watch/profile/db/legal-
procedures/frans_van-anraat_286.html (last accessed Jan. 1, 2008) (reporting that the Ap-
peals Court acquitted Anraat of complicity in genocide, but upheld his conviction for com-
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which another Dutch citizen was alleged to have provided support, includ-
ing militia, to Charles Taylor.15
B.  The Systematic Review of Allegations of Genocide and Other Mass 
Atrocities
A second area of progress that the drafters of the Genocide Conven-
tion might identify from the existence and operation of the ICC is the cir-
cumstance that there exists for the first time a judicial entity that systemati-
cally reviews allegations of mass atrocities to identify situations for investi-
gation and prosecution. One wonders if the Convention drafters would have 
been gratified or horrified to learn that the ICC Office of the Prosecutor has 
received thousands of communications and referrals in its first years of op-
eration—from individuals, organizations, and nations in over one hundred 
countries—recommending investigation and prosecution of atrocities alle-
gedly committed around the world.16 The achievement is that the ICC now 
reviews each of these communications and referrals. It determines whether 
the communications and referrals contain allegations deserving further in-
vestigation under the legal standards adopted in the Rome Statute and thus 
representing, at a minimum, the consensus of the member States of the ICC. 
As a result of this legal analysis, and of further culling based on its mandate 
of focusing upon the gravest crimes,17 the ICC has selected some situations 
for investigation (thus far, in the DRC, in northern Uganda, in the Darfur 
plicity in war crimes, and extended his sentence by two years because the defendant was 
excessively motivated by greed).  
15 See Openbaar Ministerie/Gus van Kouwenhoven, Rechtbank’s-Gravenhage, [Rb] [Dis-
trict Court, The Hague], Den Haag, 7 juni 2006, AY 5160 (Neth.) (English translation of 
judgment available at http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/resultpage.aspx?snelzoeken=true& 
searchtype=ljn&ljn=AY5160&u_ljn=AY5160), rev’d, Gerechtshof’s-Gravenhage, [GG] 
[Court of Appeal, The Hague], Den Haag, 10 maart 2008, BC 6068 (Neth.), available at 
http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/resultpage.aspx?snelzoeken=true&searchtype=ljn&ljn=BC60 
68&u_ljn=BC6068; see also TRIAL Watch: Guus van Kouwenhoven, http://www.trial-
ch.org/en/trial-watch/profile/db/legal-procedures/guus_van-kouwenhoven_289.html (last 
accessed May. 15, 2008) (noting the accused was acquitted of war crimes but sentenced to 
eight years in prison for violating a U.N. arms embargo, that conviction was reversed on 
appeal, and that Dutch prosecutors have pursued an appeal to the Supreme Court).
16 See The Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Update on Communications Received by 
the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (Feb. 10, 2006), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTP_Update_on_Communications_10_February_ 
2006.pdf (noting that over 1,700 communications had been received by February 2006). 
17 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the 
Prosecutor (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905_ 
Policy_Paper.pdf (setting forth policy of the OTP to focus on most grave crimes and most 
responsible perpetrators); see Rome Statute, supra note 5, pmbl. (stating that the ICC’s juris-
diction is over the most serious crimes of international concern); see id. at art. 17(1)(d) (es-
tablishing gravity threshold for ICC cases). 
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region of the Sudan, and in the Central African Republic), while declining 
others (e.g., in Venezuela and Iraq).  
It is impossible, of course, to achieve perfect consensus about 
which investigations and prosecutions should be accepted or declined. The 
advance is that a worldwide clearinghouse for the evaluation of allegations 
of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, is operational. Fur-
ther, the evaluation proceeds under known legal standards, to permit an ex-
amination of the merits of the decisions ultimately made.18
C.  Prevention of Genocide and Other Mass Crimes 
A final area in which the negotiators of the Genocide Convention 
might view progress in fulfilling their long-term objectives is the ICC’s 
effort to advance the most difficult aim of the Genocide Convention: the 
prevention of genocide. In each of the first three investigations it opened, 
the Office of the Prosecutor undertook to carry out investigation and prose-
cution in the midst of an ongoing conflict that qualified as one of the worst 
in the world. In doing so, the Office of the Prosecutor opened itself to every 
possible complication that accompanies an attempt to carry on a criminal 
investigation in the middle of a war. These include, most notably, the strug-
gles of conducting field investigations within the war zone, of providing 
adequate protection to victims and witnesses within that zone, and of keep-
ing ICC field staff safe. In the most extreme case, in Darfur, the Prosecutor 
decided not to conduct any investigations in Darfur itself because of the 
danger to victims and witnesses.19 The perceived benefit of each of the early 
ICC interventions—a benefit outweighing the disadvantages—was the pos-
sibility of maximizing the opportunity to have a preventive effect on the 
conflict, rather than letting the violence run its course before attempting to 
punish the perpetrators of past atrocities.  
18 For example, the reasons that the Office of the Prosecutor declined to open investiga-
tions in Iraq and Venezuela were publicized in letters dated February 9, 2006, from the Pros-
ecutor of the ICC. Letter from Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court 
(Feb. 9, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTP_letter_to_senders_ 
re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf (regarding Iraq); Letter from Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief 
Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court (Feb. 9, 2006), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Venezuela_9_February_2006.pdf (re-
garding Venezuela). 
19 See The Office of the Prosecutor of the Int’l Criminal Court, Third Report of the Prose-
cutor of the International Criminal Court to the U.N. Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 
1593, at 2 (June 14, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/OTP_Report 
UNSC_3-Darfur_English.pdf. The evidence gathered before seeking the issuance of warrants 
of arrest was sought in seventy missions in seventeen countries. See Prosecutor v. Harun, 
Case No. ICC-02/05, Prosecutor’s Application under Art. 58(7), para. 14 (Feb. 7, 2007), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-05-56_English.pdf.  
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An important qualification is that the Office of the Prosecutor did 
not target crimes committed as part of ongoing conflicts because of any 
unrealistic expectation that the ICC, in and of itself, can end violence 
through its interventions. Rather, it was hoped that by being prompt in pur-
suing its mandate of seeking accountability and naming perpetrators, the 
ICC could maximize the prospect that States and other parties could capital-
ize upon the ICC intervention to aid in ending the conflicts and deterring 
further crimes.  
As might be expected, each situation has been unique and the 
progress has been varied. In Darfur, where the violence has been the most 
intense, the Sudanese government has resisted any type of international in-
tervention and State actors are among the alleged perpetrators. It was never 
anticipated that the ICC intervention would, in itself, end the violence,20 and 
no effort thus far—whether in the realm of peacekeeping, negotiation, or 
enforcement—has curbed that conflict. Nonetheless, as is described below, 
the international community may be neglecting an important opportunity by 
failing to press for execution of the ICC arrest warrants naming Sudanese 
nationals and thereby potentially to deter current and future perpetrators in 
Darfur. In Uganda, the issuance of ICC warrants of arrest appears to have 
had a strong positive effect. The warrants of arrest naming the top leader-
ship of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) are seen to have motivated that 
leadership to enter into negotiations to end the twenty-year war that the 
LRA had been waging against the Ugandan government.21 Today, whether 
20 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593, which on March 31, 2005, referred 
the Darfur situation for ICC investigation, was adopted soon after the adoption of two other 
resolutions relating to Darfur. S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 1590 sought to foster peace in Darfur by establishing the U.N. 
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and encouraging the UNMIS to aid the African Union Mission 
in Sudan. S.C. Res. 1590, paras. 1–2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1590 (Mar. 24, 2005). U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1591 called on all parties to the conflict in Darfur to continue seeking a 
negotiated peace. See S.C. Res. 1591, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1591 (Mar. 29, 2005). 
21 See, e.g., Press Release, Security Council, Under Secretary-General Calls for Greater 
Security Council Commitment to Ending Conflicts in Democratic Republic of Congo, North-
ern Uganda, U.N. Doc. SC/8831 (Sept. 15, 2006) (reporting that then Under-Secretary Gen-
eral for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland had informed the Security Council of his belief 
“that the indictments had been a factor in pushing the LRA into negotiations, and that they 
should not disrupt the talks, and that there could be no impunity for mass murder and crimes 
against humanity.”), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8831.doc.htm; 
The Head of Delegation, Statement on Behalf of Uganda, 3, delivered to the Fifth Session of 
the Assembly of State Parties of the Int’l Criminal Court (Nov. 23, 2006), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-04-01-05-132-AnxA_English.pdf (“I would like 
to emphasize that if was not for the warrants of arrest hanging over the heads of the indictees, 
the LRA may not have agreed to the peace process.”); Northern Uganda Peace Process: the 
Need to Maintain Momentum, 46 BRIEFING ON AFR. INT’L CRISIS GROUP at 8, 12 (2007) (not-
ing that “[t]he ICC investigation of the LRA has been crucial for promoting peace, improv-
ing security in Northern Uganda, and embedding international accountability standards into 
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the LRA leadership will face arrest and accountability remains unclear, but 
an undoubted benefit flowing from the ICC intervention is that hundreds of 
thousands of refugees from the war are now returning to their homes, crop-
lands, and schools after spending years living in camps for the internally 
displaced.22
The foregoing suggests just a few of the ways in which the most re-
cent instrument of international justice—the ICC—represents the truly sig-
nificant gains that have been made, since the Genocide Convention was 
adopted, in pursuing and fulfilling the mission of punishing and preventing 
genocide and other mass atrocities. Certainly, there is much to suggest that 
the drafters of the Genocide Convention would have been impressed that 
States, albeit after six additional decades of discussion of the need to punish 
crimes under international law, reached the breadth and depth of consensus 
reflected in the Rome Statute. The fact that the ICC is now fully operational, 
despite all of the difficulties during negotiations and efforts to frustrate im-
plementation of the Rome Statute,23 represents the fulfillment of the funda-
mental aspiration of the Genocide Convention: that an “international judi-
cial organ” be vested by States with the authority to try perpetrators of 
crimes against mankind.  
negotiations” and observing that “[t]he threat of international prosecution helped bring the 
LRA to the bargaining table and remains important”).
22 See, e.g., U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Uganda Humanita-
rian Situation Report, Dec. 1–31, 2007, Sec. III, available at http://www.internal-
displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/168E810AF80AA685C12573D90 
03F785C/$file/0712+Uganda+Humanitarian+Update+December+2007.pdf (estimating that 
populations in camps for the internally displaced in northern Uganda have fallen from 1.7 
million to about 780,000 from the end of 2005 to May 2007); Moses Odokonyero, Uganda: 
Across the Airwaves Comes Reassurance to Come Home, UNHCR NEWS STORIES, Oct. 31, 
2007, http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/472609fa2.html (reporting that the improvement in 
security resulting from peace talks has made it possible for approximately a half million 
refugees in Northern Uganda to leave camps and return to homes, villages, and parishes of 
origin). 
23 The most well-known opposition has come from the U.S. government, which passed 
legislation forbidding the cooperation of governmental agencies with the ICC, and so-called 
Article 98 agreements, conditioning the ability of other governments to receive U.S. aid upon 
agreement not to surrender to the ICC any U.S. national named in an ICC arrest warrant. See
American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C. § 7421–7433 (2007); see John 
R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and Int’l Security, Remarks at the Amer-
ican Enterprise Institute: American Justice and the International Criminal Court (Nov. 3, 
2003), available at http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/25818.htm (remarking that “ . . . in order to 
protect all of our citizens, the United States is engaged in a worldwide effort to conclude 
legally binding, bilateral agreements that would prohibit the surrender of U.S. persons to the 
Court.”). 
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NEED
ICC operations to date also underscore the difficulties and chal-
lenges of seeking accountability for the world’s worst crimes. It is not a 
difficult exercise to identify the failures and shortcomings in ongoing efforts 
to punish and deter perpetrators of the world’s gravest crimes. Still, examin-
ing what the ICC has been able to do in its first years—and what it has not 
done or cannot do—sharpens the exercise. This is because the ICC, since 
the inception of the idea for such a court, has shouldered the highest expec-
tations of those who support accountability for crimes under international 
law. It lives in the hopes and imaginations of many as the ultimate instru-
ment of justice. At the same time, the ICC was never intended, nor designed 
to be, a cure-all instrument. The limitations on its authority, as well as its 
powers, were carefully drawn and agreed upon by the States at Rome.  
The result has been that even in its first years of operation, and de-
spite the not inconsiderable achievements of the ICC to date, an “expecta-
tions gap” has been revealed—a space between what observers aspire for 
the ICC to do and what the ICC has accomplished or attempted. Analyzing 
the gap, and the degree to which expectations about the ICC are realistic, 
begins to suggest the next set of challenges for enforcing an international 
rule of law. Two challenges bear consideration, particularly in light of the 
preoccupations and aspirations of those who negotiated and drafted the Ge-
nocide Convention. These challenges are to continue to build a truly global 
system of justice, based in complementarity, and to muster and strengthen 
the political will necessary to make that system effective in combating im-
punity.   
A.  Strengthening of a Global System of Accountability 
First, the ICC has served to emphasize that real progress in the fight 
against impunity will come through deepening and reinforcing a truly global 
system of accountability, rather than reliance on the latest instrument or 
“international judicial organ.” Some aspects of the ICC’s design—its per-
manence and theoretically global jurisdiction—can promote an expectation 
that the ICC will rapidly bring justice to numerous perpetrators of mass 
crimes. The degree of selectivity with which the ICC has proceeded thus 
far—ten persons named in warrants of arrest in four massive conflicts—
should serve to moderate any such expectation. 
Over time, the ICC will be able to increase its volume of cases, but 
an important outer limit exists: the ICC, like every internationalized tribunal 
before it, will never have the capacity to investigate and prosecute more 
than a small fraction of the perpetrators who fall into the category of the 
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“most responsible.”24 States determine the budgets of internationalized 
courts and it is both rational and likely that States will not fund more than a 
limited number of representative prosecutions in any single judicial organ. 
In the ICC’s case, the member States approve the anticipated number of 
situations and trials during the budgeting process,25 and thus the workload 
of the Court and the number of cases it can commence are regulated—not 
by the Prosecutor or the judges—but by the funders.  
The State funders’ requirements can be stringent. In the case of 
Darfur, the investigation was referred to the ICC by the exceptional measure 
of a U.N. Security Council Resolution. The Security Council resolution that 
referred the Darfur investigation, after stating the Security Council’s deci-
sion and urging all States to cooperate fully in assisting the ICC,26 simulta-
neously provided that none of the expenses of the Darfur investigation 
would be borne by the United Nations or offset by means other than volun-
tary contributions by States.27 Funding constraints also mean that occur-
rences that are common in law enforcement can trigger budgeting crises. 
For example, when co-defendants are arrested separately, and separate trials 
follow, the resource drain correspondingly can double, and the next prose-
cutorial priority may be crowded out.  
The lesson is that the perspective of the States, and the scale of the 
undertaking they are willing to support, must temper expectations and plan-
ning in the ongoing fight against impunity. So far, the ICC has opened in-
vestigations arising from four vast and distinct conflicts, based on a smaller 
budget than the current budgets of the ICTY or ICTR.28 If one accepts that 
24 Like all internationalized courts before it, the ICC has adopted a policy of focusing on 
the most responsible perpetrators. See OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, PAPER ON SOME POLICY 
ISSUES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 7 (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf.
25 See, e.g., INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, PROPOSED PROGRAM BUDGET FOR 2008 OF THE ICC,
para. 8, 13–25 (July 25 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-6-
8_English.pdf (setting forth the assumptions upon which the budget is based, including the 
number of investigations and trials).  
26 See S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).  
27 See id.
28 The ICC’s budget for 2007 was approximately €89 million euro, or $120 million dol-
lars, paid by member States. See Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States 
Parties Concludes Its Deliberations of the Fifth Session, ICC-ASP-20061201-190-En (Dec. 
1, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/214.html. The ICTY’s bi-
ennial budget for 2006–2007 was approximately $278 million, and the ICTR biennial budget 
for the same period was approximately $250 million. See ICTY, Report of the Int’l Tribunal 
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, para. 113, U.N. Doc. 
A/62/172-S/2007/469, available at http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/2007/AR07.pdf; 
ICTR, GENERAL INFORMATION: BUDGET AND STAFF, http://69.94.11.53/default.htm (follow 
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the ICC’s resources are unlikely to be increased by multiples in upcoming 
years, one must also accept that the ICC is unlikely to pursue anything near 
the number of prosecutions, in any one situation, that the ICTY or ICTR 
achieved. As a matter of political reality, and to maximize its unique impact, 
the ICC must spread its work across numerous different situations, but with-
in each situation focus more stringently on the most responsible perpetra-
tors.
The more promising solution to the inevitable and persistent “im-
punity gap” is to use the work of the ICC to reinforce the global system of 
justice, rather than expecting the ICC to grow into an assembly line. The 
Genocide Convention itself suggests this solution because it recognized that 
the efforts of any “international judicial organ” should supplement those of 
other competent courts. In 1948, the only available alternative was a compe-
tent tribunal in the State in which the crimes were committed. 29 Sixty years 
later, and likely beyond the imaginings of the Genocide Convention draf-
ters, there is a menu of judicial mechanisms to bring perpetrators of geno-
cide and other crimes under international law to justice. The ad hoc tribun-
als have tried cases, including cases of genocide, arising from the conflicts 
in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, hybrid tribunals are operating in Sierra Leone 
and Cambodia, and domestic prosecutions of alleged war criminals and vi-
olators of human rights—such as the prosecutions of Augusto Pinochet and 
Alberto Fujimori—are gaining in number and credibility. Initiatives have 
expanded well beyond any single “international judicial organ,” and they 
share, in addition to a common mission, a growing body of law and expe-
rience.
The challenge therefore is to build the complementarity advocated 
in the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute: to strengthen the global 
system of justice by maximizing the effectiveness and impact of the efforts 
of the combination of judicial organs addressing crimes under international 
law. Each component of the system is already reinforcing the others, and the 
objectives of punishment and prevention are best served by actively promot-
ing this reinforcement. The scope, quality, and effectiveness of domestic 
enforcement work are enhanced by the growth and acceptance of interna-
tional criminal law standards. Proceedings conducted by the ICC and other 
internationalized tribunals provide starting points and blueprints for pro-
ceedings involving perpetrators in the same conflicts who are tried domesti-
cally. The ICC can serve as a strong advocate of the international rule of 
law, as well as a global monitor of non-compliance, making it easier to pri-
“About the Court” hyperlink, then follow “General Information” hyperlink) (last accessed 
Nov. 4, 2007). 
29 Genocide Convention, supra note 2, at art. 6. 
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oritize and divide the seemingly limitless work of devising and implement-
ing remedies, including the work of prosecuting violators.  
The suggestion is not that all judicial instruments will work equally 
well. The constant factor, from 1948 to date, is the vastness of impunity and 
the impossibility of reaching all perpetrators. What has changed, through 
the robust growth of initiatives to enforce the international rule of law, is the 
opportunity and responsibility to evaluate and compare outcomes, and to be 
active and strategic in promoting the combination of remedies that can best 
advance the objective. 
B.  Constancy in Political Will 
The second challenge in preventing and punishing genocide and 
other mass crimes, as further exposed by the early operations of the ICC, is 
the ultimate dependence of the success of each anti-impunity instrument—
including the ICC—upon the political will of States. The Genocide Conven-
tion both reflected a compact among States to combat genocide and diag-
nosed that any success in combating the “odious scourge of genocide” 
would depend on continuing “international cooperation” furnished by 
States.30 It can indeed seem a dull truism to declare that mass atrocities can 
only be prevented and punished through State cooperation and action. But 
again, the ICC experience is instructive because the expectation seems to 
have been that this new, permanent “judicial organ” would somehow magi-
cally circumvent the hardest problem of mobilizing sufficient will (on the 
part of States in particular) to compel alleged perpetrators to be brought to 
justice.
The most conspicuous ICC-related example of the hard reality that 
State support will always determine the success or failure of an effort to 
bring accountability is the following circumstance: the ICC has obtained the 
arrest of only one individual who has been named in an ICC warrant of ar-
rest who was not previously in State custody. Of the three individuals cur-
rently in detention at The Hague, only Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, a former 
DRC militia leader, was arrested following issuance of an ICC arrest war-
rant. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Germain Katanga were transferred into 
ICC custody following domestic detention in the DRC. Seven alleged per-
petrators—including all of the individuals charged in the course of the Dar-
fur and Uganda investigations—remain at large. These include two Suda-
nese nationals named in warrants of arrest in April 2007: Ahmad Moham-
mad Harun, the former Minister of State for the Interior in the Government 
of Sudan and the alleged orchestrator of the arming and funding of Arab 
Militia in Darfur, and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al Rahman (known as Ali 
Kushayb), an alleged Janjaweed militia leader. Also named in as-yet-
30 See id. at pmbl. 
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unexecuted warrants of arrest are Joseph Kony, the leader of the LRA, and 
three other top LRA commanders, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, and Do-
minic Ongwen.31 Bosco Ntaganda, a co-defendant of Lubanga Dyilo, is at 
liberty and remains an active and high-ranking militia leader in the DRC. 
The misperception is that the ICC is the party responsible for ex-
ecuting these arrests and for moving the Darfur and Uganda cases past the 
pre-trial stage. The fact is that the ICC, by conscious design, was never giv-
en a police force or authority to arrest. Rather, the States, via the Rome Sta-
tute, retained this responsibility.32 This means that the mission of rendering 
punishment for atrocities—at the ICC as at any other judicial mechanism—
cannot move forward absent state support in furtherance of investigations 
and cases.  
The history and status of the ICC’s intervention in Darfur illustrates 
the division of responsibilities and the continued centrality of the issue of 
political will. The Security Council’s referral of the situation in Darfur to 
the ICC for investigation in March 2005 was an achievement in expressing 
an international consensus that the perpetrators of the horrific violence and 
crimes in Darfur should be held accountable. When, in April 2007, the ICC 
issued the arrest warrants, those warrants named individuals squarely within 
the power of the Sudanese government to turn over. Harun is currently serv-
ing as the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, and Kushayb, according to the 
Sudanese government, was made to face domestic charges proceedings, of 
which he was reportedly acquitted. The Sudanese government has stated 
repeatedly that it will surrender no Sudanese national to the ICC’s jurisdic-
tion.33
The question is now by what mechanism will Harun or Kushayb—
or for that matter any other individuals who might be named in any warrants 
31 Joseph Kony reportedly ordered the killing of Vincent Otti in October 2007, because 
Otti favored peace, but the ICC proceedings against Otti have not yet been formally termi-
nated. See, e.g., Francis Kwera, Deputy of Uganda’s LRA Executed—Deserter, REUTERS,
Nov. 30, 2007, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L30552222.htm. A fifth LRA 
commander for whom a warrant of arrest was issued, Raska Lukwiya, died while fighting 
Ugandan troops in August 2006, and the proceedings against him were thereafter terminated. 
See Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision to Terminate the Proceedings 
Against Raska Lukwiya (July 11, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library 
/cases/ICC-02-04-01-05-248_English.pdf.  
32 Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 89 (providing that arrest and surrender shall be car-
ried out, at the request of the Court, by any State within which the person named in the war-
rant may be found). 
33 See, e.g., Sudan Adamant on Darfur ‘Atrocities’ Suspects, SUDAN TRIB., Jun. 10, 2007, 
available at http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article22297 (quoting statement of Pres-
idential Assistant Nafaa Ali Nafaa that the position of the government is “clear and there is 
no room for bargaining” on the subject of arresting persons sought by the ICC). 
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relating to the atrocities in Darfur—be brought to face justice?34 What steps, 
if any, will be taken to enforce U.N. Security Council Resolution 1593, 
which both referred the situation in Darfur for ICC investigation and obli-
gated the Sudanese government to cooperate “fully” in the ICC’s investiga-
tion?35 Will States and the Security Council accept the stalemate between 
the ICC and the Sudanese government? The resolution to all of these ques-
tions, and therefore the success of the overall objective of bringing accoun-
tability in Darfur, lies not in the hands of the ICC, but within the power of 
the Sudanese government and the international community. 
In Uganda, the question is also whether sufficient resolve exists or 
can be galvanized in furtherance of the mandate to bring justice. The re-
markable achievement of a permanent end to violence in Northern Uganda 
may soon be realized, but nearly three years after issuance of warrants of 
arrest naming the top LRA leadership, the leadership remains at large, and 
progress toward the aim of accountability is at a standstill. Joseph Kony and 
other LRA leaders continue to deny having perpetrated any crimes and to 
refuse to release abducted women and children.36 These leaders have of-
fered peace only at the price of obtaining immunity from ICC prosecution.37
34 See Press Release, Security Council, International Criminal Court Prosecutor Tells 
Security Council Sudan’s Government Not Cooperating in Darfur Investigation, Massive 
Crimes Continue, U.N. DOC. SC/9186 (Dec. 5, 2007) (reporting that Sudanese government 
has not complied with its legal obligations and urging Security Council to request com-
pliance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1593), available at http://www.un.org/News/ 
Press/docs/2007/sc9186.doc.htm.
35 See S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 26. 
36 E.g., U.N. Envoy Sees Uganda Rebel Chief, BBC NEWS, Nov. 12, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6139554.stm (reporting that request for LRA to free 
abducted children had not been successful and that Joseph Kony denied holding women or 
children against their will); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press State-
ment on Situation in Northern Uganda, U.N. DOC. SC/9167, AFR/1618 (Nov. 13, 2007) 
(“The Security Council members again urged the Lord’s Resistance Army to release imme-
diately all women, children and other non-combatants.”), available at http://www.un.org 
/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9167.doc.htm. 
37 See, e.g., Press Release, U.N. Special Envoy for Areas Affected by Lord’s Resistance 
Army On Peace Talks between Ugandan Government, Rebel Group, Nov. 13, 2007 (report-
ing that in context of peace negotiations, LRA leadership had “said they would not submit to 
the Court. . . .”), available at http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2007/071113_ 
Chissano.doc.htm; LRA Rebels Want Ugandan Justice, BBC NEWS, Nov. 2, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7074471.stm (reporting that LRA negotiator wanted 
the ICC warrants of arrest withdrawn so that accountability issues could be handled domesti-
cally); U.N. Envoy Sees Uganda Rebel Chief, supra note 36 (reporting that Joseph Kony 
asked U.N. humanitarian chief for cancelling of ICC warrant of arrest as condition for attend-
ing peace talks); Ugandan Rebels in Amnesty Demand, BBC NEWS, Sept. 6, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/5320254.stm (quoting Vincent Otti: “No rebel will 
come out unless the ICC revokes the indictments.”).
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The point is that even the advent of new and potentially powerful 
mechanisms for promoting accountability will not obviate the need to con-
tinue tackling the hardest and most eternal problem: that of generating the 
political will within the international community to bring perpetrators to 
justice. Whether the perpetrator is Radovan Karadic, or Ahmad Harun, or 
Joseph Kony, an inability to arrest, as just one example, utterly frustrates the 
core objective of punishing crimes under international law. It renders theo-
retical any goal of rendering judgments or meting out punishment. 
The difficulty of galvanizing international support for arrests and 
prosecutions cannot be equated, however, to a lack of progress in the war 
against impunity. Each judicial organ that embarks on the mission of bring-
ing accountability adds another instrument that can exert moral authority, 
and thus promote consensus that perpetrators should be brought to account. 
The power of exposing violence to be criminal under an international rule of 
law, and of naming perpetrators, cannot be underestimated. The ICC, be-
cause it stands as a representative of 106 States, should be the institution 
most capable of exerting moral suasion resulting in State action. Still, if 
States, fail to provide the support necessary to advance the cases com-
menced in the ICC, they will face questions about the depth of their com-
mitment to the goal of actually ending impunity.  
The challenge is for all actors who play a strong role in advocating 
accountability for crimes against mankind—States, the United Nation, re-
gional organizations, civil society, the media, and grassroots organiza-
tions—to exert the maximum possible pressure on States to perform their 
responsibilities of supporting international and domestic mechanisms for 
protecting populations.38 It is vital that, at a minimum, the international 
community carry through criminal justice initiatives that it has directly pri-
oritized or commenced, such as in Darfur. It is also critical that States fulfill 
obligations of cooperation they have undertaken with respect to the punish-
ment of crimes under international law, by treaty, or by any other means.  
The alternative—of permitting these obligations to remain unful-
filled or half-fulfilled—can only diminish the rule of law. It is predictable, 
for example, that it might be more difficult to muster the will to arrest an 
alleged perpetrator than to agree in principle to do so. States cannot neglect 
a treaty obligation to effectuate arrest, however, simply because a Court has 
specified alleged perpetrators, by exercising independent judgment. The 
Prosecutor of the ICC has reported that in reaction to the warrants of arrest 
issued in the Darfur situation, certain States or stakeholders in the ICC 
urged him to target lower level perpetrators who might be easier to arrest 
38 In the case of Darfur, for example, activism at the grass roots level, media reporting, 
and the internet have each played strong roles in creating—to an unprecedented degree—
pressure upon the international community to seek to punish and prevent mass crimes. 
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than ministers of state or militia leaders. 39 The choice is starkly presented: 
(1) to send a message that powerful perpetrators, at a minimum, can expect 
impunity, despite the expressed resolve of the U.N. Security Council that 
punishment be meted; or (2) to find the will and the means to execute the 
arrest warrants, and thereby reinforce the deterrent effect of the ICC, for 
perpetrators at all levels of responsibility. No court will pursue precisely the 
investigations and cases that the States might agree upon or prefer, and it is 
precisely this circumstance that will compel States to evaluate the advantag-
es and disadvantages of either supporting judicial decision-making as a mat-
ter of principle, or of appearing to make politically expedient selections on a 
case by case basis. 
CONCLUSION
The Genocide Convention referenced, very much as a prospect for 
the future, a single “international judicial organ” that would render judg-
ment regarding the most serious crime of international concern, genocide. 
Sixty years later, it seems that the drafters’ aspirations of advancement were 
simultaneously too modest and too lofty. Today, there exists a network of 
judicial mechanisms, domestic and internationalized, for punishing and de-
terring crimes, including genocide, under international law. This network is 
fully engaged in strengthening an international rule of law by, among other 
things, punishing crimes and perpetrators who, in prior times, would never 
have faced justice. At the same time, the ability of courts to render judg-
ments and impose punishment for the gravest of crimes, even in the case of 
the Court which fulfilled the hope of an “international judicial organ,” re-
mains firmly tied to the will and power of States to compel the perpetrators 
of those crimes to be brought to court. Each advance in the ongoing mission 
of fighting impunity necessitates recreating the momentous achievement of 
sixty years ago: compelling and expressing a consensus that the civilized 
world finds certain crimes utterly repugnant to humanity and therefore ne-
cessary to punish and eliminate.    
39 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Statement of the Prosecutor, in COMPILATION OF STATEMENTS:
THE ELEVENTH DIPLOMATIC BRIEFING OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 8 (Oct. 10, 
2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/ICC-DB11-St_en.pdf.  
